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Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the
Judicial Power of the United States
Calvin R. Massey*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal courts have by now firmly established a variety
of doctrines by which they decline to exercise jurisdiction vested
in them by Congress. The constitutional validity of these "abstention" doctrines has been challenged in recent years by Professor Martin Redish, who contends that "[j]udge-made abstention constitutes judicial lawmaking of the most sweeping
nature."1 He characterizes the abstention doctrines "as a judicial
usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle
of separation of powers."'2 To Professor Redish, judicial construction of "a jurisdictional statute that somehow vests a power
in the federal courts to adjudicate the relevant claims without a
corresponding duty to do so is unacceptable." 3 Redish's intellectual cohort, Professor Donald Doernberg, establishes the same
point by invoking more directly the familiar admonition of Chief
Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia4 : "We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution." 5 Closely aligned with these commentators is former Justice Brennan, who has declared that the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings. B.A., 1969, Whitman College; M.B.A., 1971, Harvard University; J.D., 1974, Columbia University. My colleague, Evan Lee, provided some useful comments on an earlier draft, comments made
all the more useful by the depth of Evan's disagreement with my thesis.

1. Redish, Abstention, Separationof Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 114 (1984).
2. Id. at 76; see also Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of

"Democracy Bashing", 40

CASE

W. RES. L.

REV.

1023 (1989-90); Doernberg, "You Can

Lead a Horse to Water . . .": The Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow the Exercise of
Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 999, 1016-21

(1989-90).
3. Redish, supra note 1, at 112.

4. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
5. Id.; see Doernberg, supra note 2, at 1002.
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federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.""
It is, in my judgment, correct to observe "that these suggestions of an overriding obligation, subject only and at most to a
few narrowly drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction."' 7 It is
also correct to conclude that, as a matter of sound policy, "state
courts ... should continue to play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal constitutional principles .... [and that] federal intervention [with state proceedings] is most dubious."8 But
it is not my intent to join these choruses in defense of the abstention doctrines. Nor do I wish to argue that the abstention
doctrines result from a congressional delegation of authority to
the courts, implicit in the jurisdictional grant, "to modify or
limit the exercise of that jurisdiction in order to avoid friction
within the federal system." 9 Similarly, I eschew the argument
that abstention is rooted in an implicit legislative recognition of
the equitable power of the courts to defer the exercise of their
jurisdiction. 10
Rather, I wish to chart a different course. My thesis is that
the Supreme Court has crafted the abstention doctrines, or at
least some of them, as a continuing exercise in constitutional
law, and not merely as prudential limits upon the federal judicial power. To be sure, the accepted wisdom is that the abstention doctrines are not constitutionally required."' But it may be
6. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976). Of course, Justice Brennan's observation was qualified both by the use of the
term "virtually" as well as by the fact that it was issued in the course of an opinion
upholding a district court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction in a case with ongoing parallel state proceedings; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983). In Moses Justice Brennan repeats this sentiment, albeit in a
case in which the Court refused to acquiesce in a district court's refusal to exercise its
jurisdiction because of an ongoing contract claim in the state courts. Id. at 13-28.
7. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545 (1985).
8. Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation,22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 605, 637 (1981).
9. Redish, supra note 1, at 80.
10. Id. at 84-85. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 549-50, 570-74.
11. See Matasar & Bruch, ProceduralCommon Law, Federal JurisdictionalPolicy,
and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1291, 1337-39 (1936) (abstention is "founded solely on judicial policymaking"); Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv.
1097 (1985) (abstention is a federal common law doctrine); Zeigler, An Accommodation
of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional
Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 269-70 (1976)
(Younger abstention is a "judicially developed policy of self-restraint combining ...
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that such wisdom is so readily accepted because it comports so
closely with the wishes of its adherents.12 I seek to demonstrate
in this article that a better explanation of the abstention doctrines lies in the thesis that the doctrines, in some form, are
compelled by the Constitution.
I do not propose to chart the constitutional boundary of the
abstention doctrines along the entire frontier of state and federal judicial power. My goal is far more limited; I simply wish to
make the case that the Court, whatever its rhetoric, acts as if the
abstention doctrines, or at least some of them, are mandated by
the plan of the Constitution. More specifically, I hope to make a
plausible argument that the abstention doctrines are part of a
larger constitutional task in which the Court is continually engaged: the monitoring of the limits of the federal judicial power
and the corollary congressional power to vest the federal courts
with jurisdiction. Whether the Court is doing this by finding
some independent normative and limiting force in the tenth
amendment or whether it is doing this by finding some implied
limitation upon federal judicial power in article III is ultimately
of less importance than recognizing that this is, in fact, what the
Court is doing.
principles of comity, equity, and federalism"). Of course, Professor Redish takes this
position since he thinks the abstention doctrines violate the Constitution. See M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER

233-321 (1980);

Redish, supra note 1, at 71, 74, 112, 114 (abstention violates the separation of powers

doctrine). But see E. CHEMERINSKY,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

627-28 (1989) (discussing the

possibility that Younger abstention is a constitutional rather than prudential rule).
12. In addition to the views of Professors Redish and Doernberg, supra notes 1 and
2, see also Mullenix, A Branch Too Far:Pruningthe Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo. L.J.
99, 101 (1986) (Colorado River abstention "is an invidious encroachment on the constitutional and statutory rights of federal litigants" which "is merely a doctrine of judicial
convenience that has no place in American jurisprudence"); Zeigler, A Reassessment of
the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 987, 988 (by employment of Younger abstention "the federal courts' refusal to use
their equitable powers to reform state justice systems directly contravenes the intent of
the Reconstruction Congresses that adopted the fourteenth amendment and enacted section 1983"). It is likely that the views of these commentators are influenced by their
subscription to the "nationalist" model of judicial federalism, which is premised upon
the ubiquitous supremacy of the national government, and assumes that only the federal
courts will effectively and vigorously enforce federal rights. By contrast, it is evident that
I subscribe to a different model, one which stresses the importance within the federal
constitutional design of state initiatives and obligations, contends that national intrusion
upon state law should be minimal and effected cautiously, and regards the state judiciary
as constitutionally and functionally competent to vindicate federal rights. See generally
Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) (presenting
and discussing these two typologies of the law of federal jurisdiction).
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Part II of this article analyzes the constitutional and judicial bases for my theory that the abstention doctrines are constitutionally mandated. Part III analyzes each abstention doctrine
in light of my theory, leading to the conclusion that abstention
is better understood as a constitutional mandate than as a prudential doctrine of judicial creation.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN OUTLINE
Professor Philip Bobbitt has identified six modes of constitutional argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential,
structural, and ethical. 13 Rare is the constitutional argument
that can incorporate successfully all six modes. Indeed, some
types of argument, such as textual and prudential, are inherently antagonistic. 14 My argument is principally structural, relying on the claim that "a particular principle or practical result is
implicit in the structures of government and the relationships
that are created by the Constitution among citizens and governments."'15 However, my argument is also buttressed in places by
resort to textual, doctrinal, and prudential arguments.
Given that "it is a Constitution we are expounding"' 6 and,
more particularly, a written one, it is incumbent to begin with
text. There are at least three textual sources of the constitutional root of the abstention doctrines, but they are not determinative either in isolation or in combination. Other modes of constitutional argument must be joined to the textual in order to
manufacture a plausible contention that abstention has a constitutional foundation.
13. P. BOBBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-8 (1982). Historical argument "marshals the
intent of the draftsmen of the Constitution and the people who adopted the Constitution." Id. at 7. Textual argument is "drawn from a consideration of the present sense of
the words of the provision." Id. Doctrinal argument "asserts principles derived from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on precedent." Id. Prudential argument
"advanc[es] particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts in
a particular way." Id. Structural arguments claim that "a particular principle or practical
result is implicit in the structures of government and the relationships that are created
by the Constitution among citizens and governments." Id. Ethical argument is not moral
argument but, rather, "constitutional argument whose force relies on a characterization
of American institutions and the role within them of the American people." Id. at 94.
14. Id. at 59-61.
15. Id. at 7. Perhaps the foremost exponent of this form of argument is Charles
Black, Jr. See C. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
(1969).
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis omitted).

LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER
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A.

The Supremacy Clause

The supremacy clause provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
or
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
17
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The emphasized passage seems to contemplate that the state
courts would. possess some measure of concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal courts. Otherwise, there would be no reason to
include an explicit command to the state judiciary that they act
in obeisance to paramount federal statutory and constitutional
law.
Support for that reading of the supremacy clause can be derived from that most germinal of cases, Marbury v. Madison. 8
As Professor Bator has put it, "[t]he deepest significance of the
judicial power recognized in Marbury v. Madison is, ultimately,
not that it permits the lower federal courts to disregard unconstitutional acts of Congress, but that it makes it the duty of the
state courts to do so.''1 In justifying judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall never alluded to the powers of the federal courts;
neither did he speak of judicial review as being limited to federal judicial review. 20 Rather, his defense of judicial review was
in terms of the obligation of all courts to maintain fidelity to
law. 21 To Marshall, it was almost self-evident that, in a society
with a written Constitution, the highest form of law was that
Constitution. 22 The obligation of obedience to federal law, imposed upon the state courts by the supremacy clause, demands
that the state judiciary, no less than their federal siblings, undertake the burdens of constitutional judicial review.
In Federalist 82, Alexander Hamilton delivered his famous
exposition of the relationship of the state courts to the federal
courts. He concluded that state courts would possess concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts unless Congress plainly
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

2 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Bator, supra note 8,at 628-29 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 629 n.60 (interpreting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-80).
Id.
Id.
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invested the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over "objects intrusted to ... [congressional] direction."2 3 Hamilton did
not ground his conclusion upon the supremacy clause; rather, he
proceeded from the proposition that "the States will retain all
preexisting authorities which may not be exclusively delegated
to the federal head. '2 He then interpreted article III's directive
that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may. . . ordain and establish"25 to refer simply to a division of federal judicial power among the various federal courts,
rather that a statement that the federal courts "should alone
have the power of deciding those causes to which their authority
is to extend."2' 6 Hamilton was quick to limit this principle of
concurrent jurisdiction "to those . . . causes of which the State
courts have previous cognizance. '27 This allowed for the possibility that "the United States, in the course of legislation upon
the objects intrusted to their direction, may. . . commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the fed'28
eral courts solely.
Hamilton thus recognized both that the Constitution contemplated that the state courts could not be deprived altogether
of their concurrent jurisdiction, and that Congress possessed the
power to create a class of cases with respect to which the federal
courts might exercise exclusive jurisdiction. For both of these
positions to be viable, it is essential that some line be established demarcating the limits of congressional power to strip the
state courts of their concurrent jurisdiction. Hamilton's proposed test for this constitutional dividing line was to read article
III as containing an implicit prohibition upon congressional
vesting of the federal courts with jurisdiction which would operate to prevent the state courts from considering federal claims in
the type of cases of which the state courts had cognizance prior
to the Constitution.2 9
Regardless of whether Hamilton's limiting principle is the
appropriate one, the principle of concurrent jurisdiction oper23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 421 (A. Hamilton)

(M.Beloff ed. 1987).
Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
US. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 421 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff, ed. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ates in tandem with the dictates of the supremacy clause to
compel at least three results. First, the "state courts have the
solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts 'to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.' ,0 Second, "[t]he Supremacy
Clause both imposes this responsibility and limits the discretion
of the sovereign state courts: violations of federally protected
'31
rights are susceptible to correction in the federal courts.
Third, if the state and federal courts share jurisdiction over
cases of which the states had pre-constitutional cognizance,32 the
states will retain their pre-constitutional jurisdiction in those
cases, unless the Constitution has given exclusive jurisdiction to
the federal courts. While article III is "[t]he only thing in the
. . . Constitution which wears the appearance of confining the
causes of federal cognizance to the federal courts, 334 article III

also "admits the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals. 35 It is thus incontestable that the concurrent jurisdiction
of the state courts may not be entirely eliminated. Should Congress vest the federal courts with jurisdictional authority to entertain federal claims that is so expansive that it would effectively foreclose the possibility that the state courts might hear
and decide any federal claims, the supremacy clause's explicit
contemplation of concurrent jurisdiction would be offended.
Given the existence of general federal question jurisdiction in
the federal trial courts and the removal statutes, it is entirely
possible that state courts might be wholly foreclosed from entertaining concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims. To prevent
this, and to preserve the ability of the state courts to define
state law, it is necessary to have some limiting principles, like
the abstention doctrines, by which federal jurisdiction may be
restrained. This principle, a mixture of the textual and struc30. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111
U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
31. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 61, 80 (1989).
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 421 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed., 1987) (concurrent jurisdiction is "clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes of which the State
courts have previous cognizance").
33. Id. ("[Tihe State courts will retain the jurisdiction they [had prior to the Constitution] . . .unless it appears to be taken away ... [by] exclusive delegation [in the
Constitution] . . .to the federal head.) (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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tural arguments, might well be the seed of at least a few of the
trees in the abstention forest.
B.

Article III.

Article III vests the federal judicial power in the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts and describes the outer limits
of that judicial power. But as we have seen, article III does not
compel the conclusion that the federal courts are, by virtue of
the Constitution itself, given exclusive jurisdiction over all federal claims. Accordingly, although article III might be construed
to mean that Congress has the power to vest the federal courts
with exclusive jurisdiction of every federal question, such a reading "would amount to an alienation of State power by implication,. . . [and thus is not] the most natural and the most defensible construction."3 6
This should not be surprising, for it is well-settled that Congress may not expand federal judicial jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries contained in article III.3 It is also well-settled that
parties may not consent to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction beyond those boundaries.3 Thus, Congress possesses no
more authority to deprive the state courts of all jurisdiction over
federal claims than it does to compel the federal courts to render
advisory opinions."9 Neither limitation is explicit in the text of
article III; both are derived from the linguistic and structural
implications of the text.
What may be more surprising is the actual conduct of the
36. Id.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
38. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (federal question jurisdiction); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379
(1884) (diversity jurisdiction).
39. Since the earliest years of constitutional union it has been the established view
that article III does not contemplate the exercise of such authority by the federal judiciary. See, e.g., D. CURRiE,THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888 6-14 (1985) (discussing the origins of the advisory opinion limitation).
This constitutional limitation has not prevented individual justices from delivering to
the other branches of national government both extra-judicial advice and confidential
information concerning pending cases. See, e.g., W. LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL
POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLrIcs 28-32 (1988) (discussing the private
communications between President Buchanan and Justices Catron and Grier concerning
the outcome of the then pending Dred Scott case); B. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND
RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 186-211 (1988); Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary
by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial
Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 633 (1962).

811]

LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER

Court with respect to its original jurisdiction, a jurisdictional
grant that is self-executing and irreducible. 40 Despite the apparently mandatory nature of this jurisdiction, the Court regularly
denies leave to file complaints that are within its original jurisdiction.4 1 One justification for doing this has been that "the
grant of original jurisdiction cannot be regarded as compelling
this Court to assume [a burden] which might seriously interfere
with the discharge by this Court of its duty in deciding the cases
and controversies appropriately brought before it." 4 2 Another
justification is that, so long as another competent forum was
available, the Court need not assume the burdens of original jurisdiction inasmuch as those obligations might seriously interfere with its more important function as a final constitutional
court of review. 43 In reaching these decisions, the Court has delivered itself from the rigid rule set forth in John Marshall's emphatically blunt statement in Cohens v. Virginia.44 Marshall's
statement became viewed as not being "universally true but...
qualified in certain cases. 45 The obligation of "a court possessed
of jurisdiction. . .[to] exercise it"' 6 became only generally true.
Even more surprising is the fact that the Court refused, in California v. West Virginia, 7 to accept a case within its exclusive
original jurisdiction. Since no other forum is available for the
adjudication of such claims, the Court's decision is obviously inconsistent with its prior rationale for declining to exercise its
original jurisdiction.
The Court's treatment of its original jurisdiction is certainly
evidence that it believes it possesses a wide measure of discre40. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861). But see Amar, A
Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,
65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 254 n.160 (1985) (contending that article III's grant of original jurisdiction over "[c]ases ... in which a State shall be a Party," U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cL.
2, is a permissive grant of jurisdiction, requiring congressional action to effectuate and
subject to congressional restrictions). But even if Professor Amar's view is accepted, Congress has acted to mandate the original jurisdiction of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251
(1988).
41. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (refusing to
permit an action by a state complaining of pollution against an out-of-state manufacturer); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939) (refusing to permit Massachusetts to
file a complaint for taxes allegedly owed by a citizen of Missouri).
42. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. at 19.
43. Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 498.
44. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 440 (1821).
45. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. at 19.
46. Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 496-97.
47. 454 U.S. 1027 (1981).
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tion in deciding whether to exercise the jurisdiction it possesses.
Nor is this the only evidence available to prove the point, for
Professor David Shapiro has demonstrated that federal courts
employ a wide variety of discretionary devices both to refuse to
exercise jurisdiction and to determine whether they even possess
jurisdiction.48
My point, however, is a bit different. The Court could not
act as it does if it believed that a mandatory grant of jurisdiction
carried with it a constitutional obligation to exercise the granted
jurisdictional authority. :[ndeed, even in the case of the Court's
original and exclusive jurisdiction, the Court sees no constitutional impediment to its refusal to exercise jurisdiction it plainly
possesses. This is not to suggest that the Constitution somehow
compels the Court to refrain from exercising its original jurisdiction. But when taken together with such doctrines as that pertaining to advisory opinions, it suggests that the Court views the
jurisdictional authority and limits of article III as roughly analogous to an imaginary mollusk containing a flexible and permeable membrane attached to and encased within a hard shell. The
shell represents the outer constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction; the membrane contains the actual jurisdictional authority exercised by the courts. Congress may pour jurisdiction into
the jurisdictional membrane until it reaches the constitutional
limits defined by the hard outer shell. None of that jurisdiction
can seep through the shell, for it is impermeable to jurisdiction
which is beyond the constitutional limits of article III. But the
Court can squeeze the membrane within the shell. When it does
so, some of that potential jurisdiction seeps through the permeable membrane to be contained by the shell, and the courts exercise only the jurisdiction remaining within the membrane. It is
this discretionary squeeze of the membrane in order to shrink
the allotted jurisdiction that is usually thought to be the core of
the abstention doctrines. But, as will be seen shortly, it is my
contention that it makes more sense to conceive of the abstention doctrines as part of the outer shell. For immediate purposes, it is enough to note that the Court acts as if article III
consists of both a jurisdictional membrane malleable at the discretion of both Congress and the federal courts and a hard constitutional shell containing and limiting federal jurisdiction.
48. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 547-70.
49. A similar phenomenon, outside the scope of this paper, has occurred with re-
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C.

The Tenth Amendment

When the Court in United States v. Darby,50 pronounced
the tenth amendment51 to be a "truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered,

'52

the idea that the tenth amendment

had any normative and independent significance seemed to have
been interred forever. Nevertheless, thirty-five years later, in
National League of Cities v. Usery,5 3 the Court held that a combination of the limits of the commerce clause54 and the tenth
amendment prohibited Congress from enforcing the minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 55
against the states "in areas of traditional governmental functions. '56 After a decade of inconclusive litigation concerning the
57
precise identity of those "traditional governmental functions,"
the Court reversed direction and overruled National League of
Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.58 It is thus tempting, but unwise, to treat the tenth amendment "as having been consigned to the nether world [sic] of non59
justiciability."
By a five-to-four vote the Court in Garcia concluded, in effect, that if states desire to preserve any aspect of their sovereignty within the federal system they must look to Congress, and
not to the courts.6 0 The Court recognized that the tenth amendspect to standing. Once thought of as a prudential doctrine, standing has been transformed by the Court into a doctrine with both prudential and constitutional aspects.
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).
50. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
51. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
52. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
54. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
55. The specific statute in question was the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a), 88 Stat. 58, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1970).
56. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
57. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (railroad operation not a traditional government function).
58. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
59. Massey, supra note 31, at 72.
60. "IT]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Garcia, 469
U.S. at 550.
[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on
federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of
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ment was intended to and does affirm state sovereign authority

but
the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not
vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers
no guidance about where the frontier between state and federal
power lies. In short, we have no license to employ freestanding
conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.$1
The frontier is to be found by locating the outer edges of
congressional power under the Constitution:
[T]he sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution
itself. A variety of sovereign powers ... are withdrawn from
the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article
works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy
Clause of Article
62
VI) to displace contrary state legislation.
By this restatement of familiar principles the Court implicitly
recognized that state sovereignty predated constitutional union.
Indeed, the Court treated the tenth amendment as securing to
the states certain residual sovereign powers but regarded the extent of those sovereign powers as measured by the area left for
state action after Congress has validly exercised its delegated
powers.6 3
federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
by judicially created limitations on federal power.
Id. at 552. The Court has expanded upon this view in South Carolinav. Baker, 485 U.S.
505 (1988), characterizing Garcia as holding that tenth amendment "limits are structural, not substantive-i.e., that States must find their protection from congressional
regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres
of unregulable state activity." Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
61. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
62. Id. at 548.
63. Professor Walter Berns contends that the tenth amendment, by itself, "is not
and cannot provide a rule of law of the Constitution," and that its legal meaning can
only be supplied by reference to other constitutional limitations on the exercise of congressional power. Berns, The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in A NATION OF STATES

139, 146, 158-61 (R. Goldwin ed. 1974). But see R

BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'

84 (1987) ("Why does not the express reservation of undelegated powers equally
furnish the 'terms' of constitutional adjudication?").
The approach to the tenth amendment shared by the Court and Professor Berns
assumes that the task is simply to describe the limits of federal power; whatever remains
is state sovereignty. An alternative approach is to start with state power: all powers are
reserved to the states except those prohibited and those delegated. Thus, unless ConDESIGN
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By contrast, National League of Cities was a short-lived effort to find in the tenth amendment a principle of state sovereignty insulating some state activities from congressional regulation that would otherwise be valid if applied to private citizens.
Garcia's abandonment of this enterprise signals the Court's unwillingness to stake out a boundary to congressional power as
applied to the states which is more restrictive than that applicable to private citizens. The conventional reading of Garcia is
that the "Court abdicate[d] tenth amendment questions."6 To
an extent this is correct, for the Court has indeed retreated from
the labor of finding in the tenth amendment some independent
normative limits on congressional power applied to the states.
The Court prefers instead to transfer to article I the judicial interpretive task of surveying the federal-state frontier. On the article I front, generous readings of congressional power will con5
tinue to push the federal boundary well into state territory.
It would be premature, however, to pronounce the tenth
amendment dead. Garcia may have done so for the moment
with respect to the contention that the tenth amendment created a zone of state immunity from the congressionally wielded
club of the commerce power, but it does not necessarily stand
for the proposition that the tenth amendment has no independent role to play with respect to the limits of the federal judicial
power. Garcia accepts the prevailing wisdom that the limiting
gress acts pursuant to a power that is comfortably within the zone of authority delegated
to it, Congress has usurped authority belonging to the states. Though the end result is
theoretically identical, the manner in which the inquiry is formulated suggests a great
deal about the likely conclusions concerning distribution of state and federal power. A
good example of the latter approach is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[c]ommerce among the States" does not
comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same
State ...
[T]he enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the
[commerce clause] power was to be extended . . . presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something . . . must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.
Id. at 194-95. Thus, when Marshall correctly observed that "the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects," it is evident that his
starting point was to focus on the reserved powers of the states to regulate their internal
commerce. Id. at 197.
64. Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism:On the Need for a Recurrence to
FundamentalPrinciples, 19 GA. L. REv. 789, 793 (1985).
65. It is true, however, that there exist revisionist notions of congressional power
which argue for a reversal of this trend. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 63; Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987).
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force of the tenth amendment is precisely coterminous with the
extent of federal power under the Constitution. Thus, since the
Court treats article III as containing some implicit, but quite
real, limits on"the reach of federal judicial power, it is quite possible that the Court uses the tenth amendment, sub silentio, as
the other blade of a pair, of scissors with which it prunes the
ever-growing twigs of the .federal judicial power.
Indeed, it is evident that there are a number of "freestanding" conceptions surrounding federalism which have at their
core notions of state sovereignty. Though the Court does not
clearly refer to these principles as tenth amendment guarantees,68 it does treat them in practice as rooted in tenth amendment principles of residual sovereignty. 7 The rhetorical label
applied is usually that of "federalism and comity."6 8 Once these
"freestanding" sovereignty notions are treated as aspects of a
state's residual sovereignty preserved by the tenth amendment,
it becomes apparent that, despite protestations to the contrary
in Garcia, the Court is constantly engaged in a judicial patrol of
the frontier between federal and state sovereignty, at least with
respect to the sector defining the relative judicial power of the
states and the federal government.
D. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
The Supreme Court has "from the time of its foundation
. . .adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of
state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds. ' 69 Until Michigan v. Long,70 this doctrine proved to be
66. The Court has, however, begun to provide verbal, if not substantive, recognition
of this point in the context of consideration of post-Garcialimits on congressional power
to regulate the activities of the states. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5
(1988) ("We use 'the Tenth Amendment' to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth
Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the
Constitution").
67. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 31, at 75-87 (discussing the implicit tenth amendment foundations to such doctrines as adequate and independent state grounds, the Erie
rule, exhaustion, abstention, the anti-injunction act, and the constitutional law pertaining to the compact clause).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 95-209.
69. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). The proposition follows from the fact
that, with one brief exception dealt with in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1874), the Supreme Court's statutorily created appellate jurisdiction of state
court judgments has always been limited to review of federal questions decided by the
state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948) and infra note 72.
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a "vexing issue ' 7 as the Supreme Court struggled with the
problem of deciding whether a state ground had been passed
upon and, if so, whether that ground was sufficiently adequate
and independent of federal claims present in the litigation to
support the state court's decision.7 2 Michigan v. Long clarified
matters somewhat by its determination that, in cases presenting
both federal and state issues, the state judgment would be presumed to rest on federal law unless the state court included in
its opinion a plain statement of its reliance on state law as the
ground for decision.
Where federal claims are present, the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine has been claimed to be constitutionally required 7 3 compelled by statute7 4 or merely pruden70. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
71. Id. at 1038.
72. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-24 (2d ed. 1988);
Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases:
Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA L. REV. 799 (1985) (discussing the methodology
of Michigan v. Long against a backdrop of prior law); Hill, The Inadequate State
Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1965) (discussing the pre-Michigan v. Long methodology
by which the Court assessed the adequacy of state grounds).
73. The constitutional argument begins with the proposition that where a state
court judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds the federal courts are
deprived of jurisdiction of all claims in the case, including the federal ones. If this is so,
it must be because of the respect due one sovereign by another. Though "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation ... is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself," Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), that self-imposed limitation
can be read into either the principle of residual state sovereignty embodied in the tenth
amendment or the implicit limitations of article Ill on the federal judicial power. This
idea derives some support from Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1874), in which the Court expressed doubt about the power of Congress to enable the
federal courts to review and decide issues of state law independently of the state courts.
Id. at 626, 633. Professor Tribe contends that Murdock bars the Court from "reviewing
federal issues in those cases which also contain state issues dispositive of the case." L.
TRIE, supra note 72, at § 3-24, 163 (emphasis in original). This is because Murdock has
a "constitutional resonance" which prevents Congress from authorizing the Supreme
Court to decide state law issues. Id. at 380; see also Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 503 (1954).

74. Congress, of course, has authority under the "exceptions and regulations" clause,
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, to alter the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction; see also

Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (recognizing some power of Congress to
withdraw appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in cases arising in the federal
courts). From the Judiciary Act of 1789 onward, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction from state courts has been limited to cases posing certain federal issues. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(Supp. 1989)). In 1867 Congress removed a proviso in section 25 of the 1789 Act which
limited the Court's appellate jurisdiction to the review of federal issues. Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590 (1874), the Court concluded that Congress had not intended to confer jurisdiction
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tial. 5 The disagreement stems from the ambiguous and
politically charged origins of the doctrine in Murdock v. Memphis,7 6 a Reconstruction era case which posed great potential for
conflict between Congress and the Court.
Commencing with the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction had been consistently limited to
cases posing issues of federal law. 7 But in 1867, at the peak of
the centralist fervor of Reconstruction, Congress acted to remove a portion of section 25 of the 1789 Act that limited the
Court's appellate jurisdiction to review of federal issues. 8 When
the question of whether Congress possessed the power to vest
the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over state law
over state law matters since the repeal of the 1789 proviso was not a sufficiently clear
statement of such intent. Id. at 619, 630. Congress has never responded by an explicit
grant of such jurisdiction, apparently content that its statutory directives are satisfied by
the Court's employment of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.
75. Ever since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), federal
courts have possessed power to review state judgments of federal statutory or constitutional law. As a theoretical proposition, a case containing a federal issue confers federal
jurisdiction; the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is not a jurisdictional
bar but is a judicial refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. Matasar and Bruch contend that
Martin "also broadly authorizes federal review of state law matters for their compatibility with federal law." Matasar & Bruch, supra note 11, at 1297 (emphasis in original).
More precisely, their contention is that in deciding the first installment of the Fairfax
grant litigation, Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), the
Court was compelled to pass upon the validity of Hunter's title under Virginia law to a
portion of the Falrfax grant. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 11, at 1297-98. In fact, the
ultimate title determination hinged on federal treaty law issues. Martin, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 358. Inquiry into the state of title under Virginia law was simply a "preliminary inquiry" undertaken in order to "construe the treaty in reference to that title." Id.
See also Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 305-07 (1810) (similar inquiry made
into Maryland law in order to determine treaty issues).
Matasar and Bruch also rely on Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), for support of the proposition that the federal courts may take jurisdiction of a case if it contains any federal issue and thereafter decide both state and
federal issues presented. See Mattsar & Bruch, supra note 11, at 1299-1300. The claim is
overbroad, for Osborn does not purport to hold that the federal courts may decide state
law independently and thereafter bind the states through the supremacy clause. This
might have been true in diversity cases under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), but not after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In any case, the
federal courts have never had such power in federal question cases.
76. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). Murdock is commonly regarded as a germinal
source of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, though that reading of
Murdock has recently been criticized. See Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883, 920-22 & nn.180-81 (1986); Matasar & Bruch, supra
note 11, at 1317-22.
77. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1989)).
78. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87.
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came before the Court in Murdock, the Court side-stepped this
politically volatile issue. The Court did this by concluding that
Congress' partial repeal of section 25 of the 1789 Act lacked a
sufficiently clear statement of intent to confer upon the federal
courts jurisdiction over state-law matters. 9 Given the adamantly
centralist focus of the Reconstruction Congress, this reading of
congressional intent is a bit suspect. However, in the wake of
Murdock, Congress took no action to make plain its intent to
confer such jurisdiction. Nevertheless, while the narrow holding
of Murdock supports the conclusion that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is compelled only by statute, the
implications of a statutory extension of such jurisdiction argue
strongly that the doctrine is compelled by the Constitution.
Because Congress has never conferred upon the Supreme
Court the power to review state court determinations of state
law in federal question cases, 80 the issue of the constitutional validity of federal judicial review of purely state claims has never
squarely arisen.81, If Congress did so act, one of two alternatives
would inevitably result. First, the exercise by the federal courts
of a power of appellate review over pure state law issues could
result in the creation of a federal common law which would displace state law through the medium of the supremacy clause.8 2
Any state law could ultimately be rendered impotent in the face
of a contrary rule under the federal common law. For example,
in a case arising under Washington law in which the plaintiff
claims punitive damages, a federal court might conclude that
Washington's rule prohibiting the award of punitive damages is
displaced by a contrary rule under federal common law. The
other alternative is the implausible phenomenon of a federal
court altering settled interpretations of state law under the pretense of acting as the state's highest court of appeal. Thus, in
the first example, a federal court would simply overrule the
79. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 619, 630.
80. See supra note 74.
81. But see discussion of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)
and Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), supra note 75.

82. It can be argued that this result bears some similarities to the doctrine of
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), which fashioned a post-Erie
federal common law with respect to commercial paper issued by the United States and
which necessarily displaced otherwise applicable state law pertaining to commercial paper. But because Clearfield Trust is rooted in the idea of the sovereign immunity of the

United States it does not stand for such a sweeping proposition as the idea that all state
law could be displaced by a federal common law.
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Washington prohibition of punitive damages awards and make
that revision binding upon Washington through the supremacy
clause. In the second scenario, a state's law would be held hostage to its ultimate interpretation or revision by the federal
courts.
Either alternative would require the Court squarely to face
the issue of whether the states can be deprived of their law-making autonomy by Congress. Professor Deborah Jones Merritt has
argued that, unless the states "retain sufficient autonomy to establish and maintain their own forms of government," 3 they are
deprived of the federal government's pledge to "guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."'4
The wholesale destruction of a state's independent law-making
power certainly would seem to be the loss of the power to maintain its own form of government. This potential for elimination
of state sovereignty also suggests rather strongly that federal review of pure state law issues does not comport with the residual
sovereignty guaranteed to the states by the tenth amendment.
Put more conventionally, such review seems to be outside the
implicit limits of the federal judicial power created by article III.
Whatever the specific constitutional source, the conclusion
of highly regarded constitutional commentators that such congressional action would violate the tenth amendment or other
"related principles of state autonomy" 85 surely indicates a belief
that the doctrine is constitutionally required. Either the tenth
amendment possesses some normative core of its own, even after
Garcia, or the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
is further evidence of article III's implicit limits upon the federal
judicial power. 8 It is within that core-which includes the "tacit
83. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Of course, ever since Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849), the guarantee clause has been consigned to the constitutional purgatory of nonjusticiability. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). But see Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government"?, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 159, 160-63 (1989) (contending that
state courts can and should interpret the meaning of this guarantee).
85. L. TRIBE, supra note 72, at §3-24, 163.
86. These limits find their substantive meaning in notions of state sovereignty. It
may be equally likely that this normative core of state sovereignty derives from the delegated and limited nature of the powers given Congress under article I. The result is the
same as if the tenth amendment or article III were read to impose the limits. Indeed,
given the helix-like relationship between congressional power, federal judicial power and
the tenth amendment, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate these concepts.
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postulates" 87 of the Constitution with respect to state sovereignty-that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine resides.
E.

The Role of the FourteenthAmendment

The Constitution's structural relationship between the
states and the central government was radically altered by the
Reconstruction amendments, particularly the fourteenth amendment. Any argument that the constitutional structure implicitly
limits the federal judicial power must, therefore, confront the
structural alterations resulting from the fourteenth amendment.
There has been considerable argument over the nature of the
transformation accomplished by the fourteenth amendment.
These arguments have ranged from Justice Hugo Black's position that the amendment was, "a comprehensive restatement of
the commitments made during both the Federalist and Reconstruction periods,""8 to the withered view of Raoul Berger that
the amendment was intended simply to constitutionalize the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.9 It is implausible to treat the amendment as a restatement of federalism principles, for it is simply
not consistent with much of the prior understanding of those
principles. It is even less plausible to argue, as does Berger, that
the amendment was a sort of "superstatute," designed simply to
make the 1866 Civil Rights Act a part of the Constitution. It is
far more likely that the amendment was a "culminating expression of a broad-based effort to revise the foundational principles
of our higher law." 90 The resulting problem, as Professor Bruce
Ackerman recognizes, lies in stitching together as a coherent
whole the vision of 1787 and the vision of 1868.91
Professor Ackerman has suggested that this reconciliation
has occurred in a piecemeal fashion, by "a dialogue over time, in
which early efforts at judicial synthesis serve as precedents in a
continuing legal conversation seeking a deeper understanding of
the tension-filled relationship between [the Founding] and [the
Reconstruction]. 92 This is surely correct, but the "continuing
87. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 521
(1989) (paraphrasing Black) (emphasis in original).

89. See generally R.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

90. Ackerman, supra note 88, at 522.
91. Id. at 524-27.
92. Id. at 525.

(1977).
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legal conversation" is not a single conversation. Rather, like a
social gathering, it consists of a number of conversations occurring simultaneously, each with separate content but united by
the common interest that actuated the gathering. Thus, issues
like incorporation of the Bill of Rights are central to the "tension-filled relationship" Ackerman identifies, but the question of
whether the federal courts may ignore the concurrent jurisdiction of the state judiciaries is far more peripheral to that relationship. The reason that the latter issue is more peripheral is
that there is no immutable structural reason why state courts
are unable to vindicate federal rights. The fourteenth amendment altered forever the balance of substantive power possessed
by the states and the central government, but it did not purport
to alter the pre-existing allocation of judicial authority to adjudicate the new balance of substantive rights. Thus, the "tension"
injected into federal-state relationships by the fourteenth
amendment is less pronounced when the issue is locating the
constitutional limits of the federal judicial power. The Court's
development of the abstention doctrines has arguably been a
part of the "continuing legal conversation" about the role of the
states and the central government in light of the inconsistent
premises of the 1787 Constitution and the Reconstruction
amendments. But, as will be seen, the abstention doctrines are
the subject of a small conversation off in the corner.
F.

A Brief Recapitulation

In the abstract, the constitutional argument is simply that
the plan of the Constitution recoguized-implicitly in the
supremacy clause and article III, and explicitly in the tenth
amendment-that the states would continue to exercise judicial
authority over their own law and concurrent authority over at
least some cases raising issues of federal law. This structural argument is not disturbed by the Reconstruction amendments, for
they do not speak to the scope of either federal or state judicial
power, but rather operate to prohibit certain substantive practices of the states. The limitations upon state authority worked
by the Reconstruction amendments can be accomplished without wholesale displacement of state judicial authority over cases
in which issues of federal law are present. Moreover, as will be
seen, the manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted
the intersection of federal and state judicial power lends substantial support to the proposition that the Court is engaged in
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the constitutional task of policing the frontier between federal
and state judicial authority.
One objection to this argument is that the abstention doctrines are merely a judicially created analogue to a host of relatively minor statutory limits on federal jurisdiction, such as the
amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases93 or the
thirty-day removal deadline.94 It could hardly be contended that
a thirty-day removal deadline is constitutionally mandated; why
are the abstention doctrines any more likely to have a constitutional pedigree than these statutory limits?
There are several answers. It is the special province of the
judiciary to develop constitutional doctrines limiting governmental authority. The fact that the abstention doctrines are of
judicial manufacture is at least some, albeit quite modest, indication of a constitutional root. But not every judicial doctrine
controlling the exercise of federal jurisdiction is of constitutional
origin. As will be seen in the next section, the abstention doctrines are characterized by their almost harmonic resonance with
the structural federalism concerns identified in this section.
They operate as a set of devices which are simultaneously triggered by specific state interests (such as preserving a state's
power to determine its own law) and which respond to a more
general concern. That concern is that without the abstention
doctrines, the combination of general federal question jurisdiction in the federal trial courts and an equally general removal
statute would create the possibility that state courts could be
wholly deprived of their role as concurrent adjudicators of federal claims.
Returning to the metaphor of the imaginary mollusk, the
shape of the internal membrane may be partly determined by
the statutory judgments of Congress limiting or conditioning access to the federal courts. Congress can be more restrictive than
the Constitution demands. It has surely exhibited its intent to
be so when, for example, it has imposed a thirty-day deadline
for removal of state actions to federal court. But it is the Court
which maintains the hard outer shell of constitutional limits
upon jurisdiction. To be sure, there may be instances in which
Congress has fashioned limiting doctrines, like the Anti-Injunction Act, which replicate the outer constitutional shell. However,
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
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as will be seen in the subsequent discussion of Younger abstention, even then the Court maintains the Constitution as a separate and independent limit, via the operation of the Younger
doctrine. In short, congressional limitations upon jurisdiction reflect the prudential judgment of Congress, but at least some of
the judicially created limitations operate to enforce the limits of
the Constitution.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT APPLIED: THE
ABSTENSTION DOCTRINES

Abstention refers to a congeries of doctrines which share a
common theme: the outright rejection or postponement by a federal court of its jurisdiction "even though Congress has vested
'9 5
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear the cases in question.
There are at least four (and possibly five) major species of abstention, each bearing the label of the germinal case creating the
doctrinal variant. Younger abstention 8 operates to prevent the
federal courts from enjoining judicial and, occasionally, administrative97 proceedings occurring simultaneously in the state
courts. Pullman abstention" is a postponement of federal jurisdiction designed to enable the state courts to clarify state law in
the hopes of avoiding a federal constitutional issue. Burford abstention9 9 occurs when the assertion of federal jurisdiction might
interfere with important state regulatory or administrative
schemes. Thibodaux abstention" 0 is sometimes identified as a
separate abstention doctrine, 1 1 but has as often been treated as
merely a specific application of Burford abstention. 10 2 Like Burford abstention, the Thibodaux strain seeks to avoid the use of
federal judicial power to decide unsettled and "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial pub95. M. REDISH, supra note 11, at 233.
96. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
97. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n. v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S.
619 (1986).
98. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
99. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
100. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
101. See, e.g., Lee & Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdictionand Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 321, 335-36,
343-45. While Professors Lee and Wilkins recognize that Thibodaux abstention might
"be more properly classified as a category of Burford abstention," they analyze the doctrines separately. Id. at 336 n.86, 343-48.
102. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 308-10 (4th ed. 1983).
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lic import. ' 103 Colorado River "abstention" 10 4 is treated by the
commentators as an abstention doctrine 0 5 but it is not so regarded by the Supreme Court.10 6 Nevertheless, whether or not a
true form of abstention, the Colorado River doctrine permits
federal courts to defer to duplicative state court proceedings,
but only if the circumstances justifying such abstention are "exceptional. 10 7 The abstention doctrines thus display "a welter of
concerns regarding the proper allocation of federal judicial
power."10 8
Critics of the abstention doctrines proceed along two principal avenues of attack. A favorite route is to question "the efficacy and wisdom of the various abstention doctrines."10 9 But it
is increasingly popular to challenge the constitutional authority
of the judiciary to abstain from exercising jurisdiction.1 1 0 The
latter attack is far more germane to my purposes since, if it is a
valid criticism, there is no merit in my claim that the abstention
doctrines, or some of them, are compelled by the Constitution.
The argument challenging the constitutional validity of abstention begins with the uncontroversial proposition that article
III vests Congress with the power to both create the inferior fed103. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976) (discussing Thibodaux abstention).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 659-76; C. WRIGHT, supra note 102,
at 315; Mullenix, supra note 12, at 99.
106. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1983).
107. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); see also Moses, 460
U.S. at 25-26.
108. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 336.
109. Redish, supra note 1, at 71. In earlier articles Professor Redish employed that
method. See Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463 (1978). Other critics in this vein include Field, The
Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071
(1974); Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
683 (1981); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); Mullenix, supra note 12, at 99
(1986); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Zeigler, Rights
Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal
Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987).
110. See Doernberg, supra note 2; Redish, supra note 1; Comment, PreclusionConcerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a FederalSuit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1184, 1188-90 (1985). A related attack
is one made upon Younger abstention by contending that the doctrine is not supported
by the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1971, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See Zeigler, supra note 12, at 987.
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eral courts"', and to define their jurisdiction.11 2 From there,
things get murky. Critics of the abstention doctrines usually proceed by quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous pronouncement
11 3
in Cohens v. Virginia:
[T]his Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should .... We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution. 114
If more recent support for the proposition is thought advisable,
one need look no further back than two terms ago, when the
Court declared it to be the long established rule that the federal
courts "are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress
to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction
extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any
case in favor of another jurisdiction.""' 5
From this initial premise the constitutional critics leap
swiftly to the conclusion that abstention is "a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.' 16 There seems to be little consideration of
the possibility that the abstention doctrines, rather than constituting a judicial thumb of the nose to the Constitution, actually
represent part of the Court's considered judgment of the outer
limits of the power of the Congress to vest the federal courts
with jurisdiction.
A.

Younger Abstention

Younger v. Harris"7 held that principles of "comity and
federalism" prevented federal courts from enjoining state criminal prosecutions "except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury." 1 8 Although the
111. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
112. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850).
113. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
114. Id. at 404.
115. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2513
(1989) (quoting Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)).
116. Redish, supra note 1, at 76.
117. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
118. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971).

811]

LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER

exception was couched in terms suggesting that the Court was
basing Younger upon the historic discretion of equity courts to
dispense relief,11 it is reasonably clear that the real foundation
for the decision was not principles of equity jurisprudence, but
was "an even more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,'
that is, a proper respect for state functions."' 12 0 Although the
Court made no claim that abstention was constitutionally required, its discussion of the applicable principles of "comity"
that compelled abstention proceeded from constitutional
norms.1"2 ' The Court emphasized that "the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments ... [and] the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. 122 While employing the language of discretion
and prudence, the Court nevertheless recognized as fundamental
and controlling the principle that the states continue to exercise
residual sovereignty even over constitutional matters, so long as
some article III court retains the power of ultimate review. Indeed, it is precisely this principle that has made Younger abstention perhaps the most controversial of federal jurisdictional
issues, 23 for after a case presenting a federal constitutional issue
has made a complete tour of a state judicial system, the United
119. In part, the Younger Court's declared rationale for its decision was that "courts
of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. The Court did identify
three circumstances that might entitle a federal plaintiff to injunctive relief of state
criminal proceedings: bad faith prosecution, prosecution pursuant to a "patently unconstitutional" law, and the lack of an adequate state forum. Id. at 45, 53-54. Two of these
circumstances are chimerical. Professor Fiss has declared that "the universe of bad-faithharassments claims that can be established is virtually empty." Fiss, supra note 109, at
1115. Professor Chemerinsky claims that the Court has never applied the "patently unconstitutional" exception. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 653. The apparent sole exception to the Younger rule thus appears to be the lack of a state forum adequate to
consider the federal constitutional objections to the state prosecution.
120. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
121. Id. at 43-48.
122. Id. at 44. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 72, at §3-30, 203-04 n.9 ("it is certainly
clear . . . that the most basic underpinning of the Younger doctrine is not any special
equity concept but, rather a federalism-based notion of comity") (emphasis in original);
Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1485, 1488-89, 1531-34 (1987) (at core of Younger doctrine is concern for protecting role of state courts as independent adjudicators of state and federal constitutional
issues).
123. See E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 622-23; 17A C.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

WRIGHT,

§ 4251, 180 (2d ed. 1988).

A.

MILLER

& E.
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States Supreme Court is generally the sole article III court with
the power of review.12 Under those circumstances, the realistic
prospect of federal review is, of course, remote.
The Court's implicit recognition of a constitutionally secured right of the states to decide issues of constitutional law
without interference from a federal court deciding those same
issues in a collateral proceeding may be seen from other aspects
of the Younger doctrine as it has developed over the years. In a
companion case decided the same day as Younger, the doctrine
was extended to actions seeking declaratory relief concerning
1 2 6 the Court
criminal liability.12 5 In Hicks v. Miranda
concluded
that "where state criminal proceedings are begun against the
federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before
any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in
the federal court, [Younger abstention] should apply in full
force."1 2 7 Abstention critics rail against the Hicks decision as a
repudiation of "the century-old canon of federalism that the filing of an action in state court could not oust a federal court first
obtaining jurisdiction."' 2 But the principle supposedly repudiated was never based on the Constitution. 29 It may well be that
124. Of course, in some circumstances review may be obtained in the federal district
courts via habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1988).
125. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
126. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
127. Id. at 349. The Hicks rule has been interpreted by some of the leading commentators in the federal jurisdiction field to mean that "once a state criminal prosecution is filed, federal courts may not decide issues properly before the state court, unless
it has already done so." 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 123, at §
4253, 228 (quoting Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Law Proceedings
When Charges Are Brought After Filing of the Federal Complaint, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 205,
214-15 (1976)).
128. Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine. Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55
Thx. L. REV. 1141, 1192 (1977).
129. Soifer and Macgill rely on Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and In re
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 128, at 1193 n.210. Ex
parte Young asserted that a federal court "having first obtained jurisdiction ... has the
right . . . to hold and maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts,
until its duty is fully performed." 209 U.S. at 161-62. But the reason for this rule was not
linked to any constitutional mandate by either Ex parte Young or any of the supporting
authority cited by the Court in that case. Rather, as In re Sawyer makes clear, the rule
(at least as it relates to attempts to obtain a federal court injunction of a state criminal
prosecution) is rooted in the historic limits upon equity courts. 124 U.S. at 209-11.
Moreover, the "century old canon of federalism" embraced by Soifer and Macgill
has existed for at least that long in uneasy tension with another axiom: "the pendency of
a prior suit in another jurisdiction is not a bar to a subsequent suit [in a different jurisdiction] even though the two suits are for the same cause of action." Stanton v. Embrey,
93 U.S. 548, 554 (1877); see also McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). The two
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the Hicks "repudiation" serves instead to delineate a constitutional line between the outer limits of federal judicial power and
the correlative power inherent in the states' residual sovereignty.
Younger abstention as refined by Hicks can usefully be
thought of as the Court's way of defining the frontier between
federal and state judicial authority in the context of state criminal proceedings. Direct interference in such proceedings, or the
prevention of their commencement by the insignificant fact of
victory in the race to file first, is thought by the Court to be an
unconstitutional interference with the retained sovereign prerogatives of the states. To the extent that there are federal statutory or constitutional objections to the manner in which the
states are exercising their sovereign authority, and those objections have been resolved erroneously by the state courts themselves, the supremacy clause preserves to the federal courts the
power to review and revise such determinations.
Younger abstention is not limited to state criminal proceedings. Ever since Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,130 in which the Court
first guardedly extended the scope of Younger abstention to
state civil proceedings, the Court has proceeded to broaden the
application of the doctrine. It has been extended to cover state
civil proceedings where an "important state interest" involving
either "civil enforcement proceedings" or "orders that are
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform
their judicial functions" are implicated.13 1 In Huffman the
Court's logic was that the state civil proceeding-an action to
close a cinema on the ground that its exhibition of obscene films
constituted a nuisance-was "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases.' 1 32 The Court has stated that

Younger policies "are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial
proceedings when important state interests are involved.'

33

rules conflict to the extent that Ex parte Young declares the jurisdiction first acquired to
be exclusive; toleration of concurrent jurisdiction eliminates the problem of conflict but
not the constitutional problem presented by the necessity of maintaining some inviolate
zone of judicial authority for state courts to proceed with the disposition of their own
law. It is this last problem which preoccupied the Court in Hicks v. Miranda.
130. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
131. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 251718 (1989); cf. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982).
132. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
133. Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 432.
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However, in Juidice v. Vail,1 34 the Court stated that it was saving "for another day" the broader question of whether Younger
applies to all civil proceedings. 3 5 Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Juidice,referred to the Court's reservation as a "tongue in cheek
...signal that merely the formal announcement [of Younger's
application to all civil proceedings] is being postponed." 13 To
Justice Blackmun, that announcement was made by the Court's
extension, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 37 of Younger abstention to foreclose a federal forum for Texaco's claim that Texas'
judgment lien and appeal bond requirements in civil actions violated its federal constitutional rights. Justice Blackmun thought
Pennzoil broadened the scope of Younger sufficiently to apply
"whenever any State proceeding is ongoing, no matter how attenuated the State's interests."138
If the Pennzoil Court thought it had answered the question
reserved by Juidice the clarity of the answer has been muddied
by New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans. 3 ' The New Orleans City Council had refused complete reimbursement to the utility for costs incurred in the construction
of a nuclear power plant, despite a contrary determination by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The validity of the
Council's action became the subject of both state and federal litigation, although the federal courts abstained, invoking both
Younger and Burford. In reversing this decision, the Court conceded that utility rate regulation is "one of the most important
[state] functions" 4 0 but nevertheless found Younger abstention
inapplicable because the state interest implicated was neither a
"civil enforcement proceeding[]" nor an "order[] . . . uniquely
in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judi1 41
cial functions.
New Orleans Public Service has been criticized as utilizing
an "ultimately unsatisfying" analysis that "gives little, if any,
discernible guidance." 4 ' The problem with New Orleans Public
134. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
135. Id. at 336 n.13.
136. Id. at 345 n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
138. Id. at 1534 (Blackmun. J., concurring).
139. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
140. Id. at 2516 (quoting Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983)).
141. Id. at 2517-18.
142. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 356.
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Service is said to be that it rejects the presence of an important
state interest, by itself, as a sufficient reason for abstention, but
simultaneously identifies two categories of cases in which
Younger abstention should apply without providing any clue
why "those categories of state proceedings merit special deference by the federal courts.

' 143

Yet, if one assumes that Younger

abstention is truly an exercise in defining the constitutional limits of the federal judicial power, the decision makes considerably
more sense.
If the Court in New Orleans Public Service had relied on
the presence of an important state interest to support abstention, it would have fashioned a rule that would radically alter
the allocation of judicial power between the federal and state
courts. The new rule would have operated to prevent the federal
courts from deciding questions of federal constitutional and
statutory law whenever there exists a contemporaneous state
proceeding in which the federal issues could be litigated. The
New Orleans Public Service Court was well aware of this disturbing possibility. It rejected this outcome precisely because it
would eliminate the well-established "right of a party plaintiff to
choose a Federal court where there is a choice."' 44 At the same
time, however, the Court strove to retain as the core principle of
Younger abstention in civil matters the idea that state courts
possess unimpeachable authority both to enforce state law that
is quasi-criminal in nature and to be free of federal interference
in the processes by which they perform their judicial functions.
The identified categories reflect a recognition that the states
possess a core of sovereign judicial authority with which the federal courts may not interfere.
Indeed, the nature of the categories identified suggests that
the Court was fashioning a constitutional line for preservation of
state judicial authority not unlike that proposed by Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist 82.115 Hamilton's notion described the
preservation of state authority over federal issues arising in the
context of cases over which the states would have had pre-constitutional jurisdiction. The New Orleans Public Service categories are surely within that concept, for they preserve the states'
authority to enforce their public policies and to control the
143.
144.
212 U.S.
145.

Id.
New OrleansPub. Serv., 109 S. Ct. at 2513 (quoting WiUcox v. Consol. Gas Co.,
19, 40 (1909)).
See supra notes 23-35, and accompanying text.
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processes of their own judicial systems. Claims that the states
might do so in a manner inimical to the Constitution are preserved by the supremacy clause. The supremecy clause operates
both to preserve for the federal judicial power the opportunity
to review and revise state determinations of federal law while, at
the same time and in conjunction with the tenth amendment,
prohibiting the federal judicial power from extending so far into
the state judicial process that the sovereignty of the states is
compromised. New Orleans Public Service thus represents the
Court's attempt to map the boundary between federal and state
judicial power in the context of the civil proceeding.
The constitutional foundations of the Younger doctrine are
further buttressed by an examination of the intersection between the Anti-Injunction Act'4 6 and Younger abstention. The
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining state
court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 1 41 It has been a continuous
limitation upon the power of the federal courts to invade state
sovereignty since its enactment as part of the Judiciary Act of
1793.148 In Mitchum v. Foster,49 the Court concluded that a federal court in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action may enjoin a state
court. The Court construed section 1983 impliedly to contain
sufficient "express authorization" of Congress to escape the statutory bar of the Anti-Injunction Act. 150 While the Court may
51
have reasoned illogically as a matter of statutory construction,'
the Court was most explicit in its view that the statutorily memorialized desires of Congress do not "qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a
1 52
federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.'
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
147. Id.
148. Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. at 334, 335 (1793) ("a writ of injunction [shall
not] le granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state"). This provision has been
codified as Rev. Stat. § 720 (1878); Judicial Code § 265 (1911); 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940);
and finally, in 1948, at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
149. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
150. Id. at 240-41. This exercise of finding in section 1983 an "'implied' express
exception" to the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act has been labelled a "bizarre contortion[]" and "an oxymoron if ever there was one." Redish, supra note 1, at 87.
151. See, e.g., Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CR. L. REV.
717, 733-39 (1977); Redish, supra note 1, at 86-87.
152. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 2,13 (emphasis added). This principle was emphatically
reaffirmed in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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As a result, even if a federal plaintiff states a claim under section 1983, the Court's view is that Younger abstention must apply, even though the section 1983 claim is one which would entitle a federal court to enjoin a state court under the AntiInjunction Act.15
This is a state of affairs that has been criticized by one abstention foe as "an effective reversal of the congressional decision to make section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act."' 154 In this view, "the combined effect. . . of. . . Younger
and Mitchum is that the federal judiciary has arrogated to itself
the authority to decide when to enjoin state court proceedings.
It is difficult to imagine a starker illustration of judicial usurpation of legislative authority. ' 15' But if Younger abstention is
treated as compelled by the Constitution, the interplay between
Younger, Mitchum, and the Anti-Injunction Act becomes more
understandable.
In the constitutional view of Younger abstention, Mitchum
is simply a case of statutory construction. It may be that the
Court in Mitchum erred in its construction of both section 1983
and the Anti-Injunction Act, but that is of no significance to the
constitutional issues. If Younger is a constitutional decision, it
makes perfectly good sense that the Court would hold that, even
though a federal plaintiff has stated a claim under section 1983
(thus escaping the statutory bar of the Anti-Injunction Act), the
constitutionally mandated principle of Younger requires the
federal court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. That is precisely what the Court has done in such cases as Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc.1 56 If a federal court in a section 1983 action has the
power to enjoin a state court (because Congress has authorized
it to do so) but may not exercise that power due to principles of
"equity, comity and federalism," it appears that something necessarily exists which vetoes congressional attempts to exercise its
powers. That "something" may be simply an exercise of judicial
prudence, but it seems far more likely that it is really a judicial
recognition that Congress is acting beyond its delegated powers
or, what is virtually the same thing, a recognition that retained
state sovereignty occupies a sphere that, in some instances,
trumps congressional power.
153. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10-11.

154. Redish, supra note 1, at 88.
155. Id.
156. 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987).
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The constitutional view of Younger also explains the often
criticized rigidity of Younger abstention. The Court has declared
that "where a case is properly within [the scope of Younger abstention], there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief."1 5 '
Critics of Younger abstention typically begin with the premise
that the doctrine is rooted solely in "considerations of equity
and comity developed through decades by the Court to accommodate the tensions among state power, federal power, and individual rights."' 5 8 But these flexible concepts, charge the critics,
"have been turned into a single, rigid commandment of federal
judicial inaction that violates even such rules as equity and comity could be said to have contained. . . This rigidity has eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity.' 1 59 The
flaw in this criticism lies in the assumption that Younger abstention is simply another equitable doctrine. If it is regarded as
a constitutional command, its rigidity is far easier to understand. To invoke my earlier metaphor, Younger composes a portion of the hard outer shell of article III;1ao federal jurisdiction
cannot expand beyond its confines. Equity does not operate to
expand constitutional authority; thus, it makes more sense to regard Younger as rooted in the Constitution, not in principles of
equity.
The Younger doctrine derives its compulsive force from
mandatory principles of "equity, comity and federalism." The
instrument which mandates these considerations is the Constitution. As I have attempted to sketch out earlier, the constitutional command is primarily a structural one, derived from the
implicit limits on federal judicial power contained in the
supremacy clause, article III, the tenth amendment, and a legacy
of doctrines which have accreted around that structural principle. The net effect, as articulated in the Younger doctrine, is
that the federal courts are unable to restrain the jurisdiction of
state courts if Congress directs them to do so pursuant to an
illegitimate claim of authority, or if the federal courts themselves act outside their constitutionally limited jurisdictional
grant. From this perspective, Younger abstention is more than a
monument to customary norms of comity and federalism; it is
157. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816
n.22 (1976) (emphasis added).
158. Soifer & Macgill, supra note 128, at 1143.
159. Id.
160. See supra text following note 48.
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another embodiment of the Constitution's tacit postulates of
twin sovereignties.
B.

Pullman Abstention

Under the Pullman abstention doctrine federal courts defer
to the state courts by permitting them to resolve their own unsettled issues of state law, rather than exercising federal jurisdiction to determine the case on federal constitutional grounds.
The doctrine was created in 1941 in Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co., 6 " a case in which the Texas Railroad Commission
had issued a regulation requiring all sleeping cars to have a conductor as well as porters. Since "[fln Texas, at this time, conductors were white and porters were black,' 16 2 the regulation was
challenged in federal court on the ground that the racial discrimination inherent in the regulation violated the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection. The Court concluded that the federal courts should have refrained from determining the federal constitutional issue until the Texas courts
had been given an opportunity to decide the pertinent state-law
issue.
The Court's rationale for its decision was that abstention
"avoid[ed] . . .needless friction with state policies,' 63 and was
calculated to limit the possibility that the federal court's ruling
on issues of state law would be "supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court."'" 4 The Court further reasoned that abstention under these circumstances enabled the entire judicial
system, state and federal, to avoid ruling unnecessarily on federal constitutional claims. 6 5 All of the proffered rationales have
been heavily criticized, 6 but the doctrine remains vigorous as it
nears its semi-centennial.
None of the original rationales for Pullman abstention are
overtly connected to the idea that the doctrine might be compelled by the Constitution. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court in Pullman, seemed to ground the newborn doc161. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

162. E.

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 11, at 595.

163. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 501.
166. For a brief synopsis of the academic criticism, see Lee & Wilkins, supra note
101, at 339-43.
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trine in the historic discretion of courts of equity."' The argument that Pullman abstention is part of the constitutional outer
shell of federal jurisdiction is more diffuse than that pertaining
to Younger abstention.
Unlike Younger abstention, which when properly invoked
operates to foreclose federal jurisdiction with finality, Pullman
abstention is commonly described as a mere postponement of
federal jurisdiction, not its complete abdication.6 ' This is because, under the rule enunciated in England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners,6 9 the state courts may not finally
adjudicate the federal issues in a case unless the litigants acquiesce. Traditional preclusion rules do not operate; a federal plaintiff whose case has been presented to a state court after the federal court has abstained under Pullman may return to federal
court for relitigation of the federal issues if she has had the foresight expressly to reserve that right.17 0
From a different perspective, however, Pullman is perhaps a
doctrine even more deferential to the state courts than is
Younger, for it counsels abstention even when there is no assurance that the state courts will act to decide the case on state
grounds.'7' It requires that "when a federal constitutional claim
is premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal
court should stay its hand in order to provide the state courts an
opportunity to settle the underlying state-law question and thus
avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional
question." 17 The central purpose of the doctrine thus seems to
167. "Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies. . . ...
Pullman, 312 U.S.
at 500.
168. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980).
169. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
170. Id. at 421-22. Of course, the federal plaintiff may voluntarily present her entire
case, including the federal claims, to the state court. If she does this, either expressly or
through the inadvertence of failing to expressly reserve her right to return to federal
court for more litigation of the federal issues, the state court's determination of the federal issues will be final. Id. at 419. Of course, certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court remains available to correct any errors of federal law made by the state court
system. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988).
171. Of course, if the case is decided on federal grounds, or on an ambiguous mixture of federal and state grounds, the federal courts will exercise jurisdiction on appeal.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); see also supra notes 69-87 and accompanying
text.
172. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975) (emphasis
added). Pullman abstention only applies when a constitutional issue is posed; the presence of a federal statutory issue is not enough. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490
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be to avoid interference with state courts in their role as "the
principal expositors of state law" 173 by channelling the resolution of state issues to the state courts and reserving to the federal courts the unavoidable federal claims. While it is true that
federal courts exercising Pullman abstention generally retain jurisdiction but stay the federal action pending state law clarification 174 and the Court has "repeatedly warned" the federal courts
that Pullman abstention should only be invoked in "special circumstances," 1 75 the rationale of the doctrine partakes heavily of
the "tacit postulates" of residual state sovereignty.
It has been charged that "[a]voiding erroneous constructions of state law is a dubious foundation for abstention . ..
[because] [f]ederal courts hearing diversity cases must routinely
determine uncertain issues of state law."176 It is certainly true
that federal courts necessarily deliver informed predictions
about state law in the course of resolving diversity cases, but the
reasons for doing so in the context of diversity cases are quite
different than in a case eligible for Pullman abstention.
Under the familiar rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 7
federal courts sitting in diversity must adhere to the decisional
law of the state, except where inconsistent with paramount federal constitutional or statutory provisions, and may not infer
from the grant of diversity jurisdiction itself any power to contravene state precedents by fashioning a binding federal common law. Even in federal question cases involving state law issues, Erie commands that state decisional law be observed.17 8
(1949). The definitive treatment of Pullman abstention is Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, supra note 109.
173. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429 (1979).
174. Harris County, 420 U.S. at 83. This goal is accomplished by the England rule
that a litigant cannot be compelled to submit to the state court her federal claims for
binding adjudication. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964); supra text accompanying notes 163-65. Of course, since the federal case
remains alive, if dormant, in the federal court some state courts have taken the position
that the state courts may not entertain the claim because to do so would be to deliver an
advisory opinion in contravention of applicable state law. See, e.g., United Servs. Life
Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965). In these circumstances, the Supreme
Court has held that federal courts exercising Pullman abstention may dismiss the federal
case "without prejudice so that any remaining federal claim may be raised in a federal
forum after the [state] courts have been given the opportunity to address the state-law
questions." Harris County, 420 U.S. at 88-89.
175. Harris County, 420 U.S. at 83.
176. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 340.
177. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
178. See United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947); Field, supra note
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179
When considered in league with Murdock v. City of Memphis,
which is generally regarded as articulating the principle that the
Supreme Court may not review issues of state law, 180 the Erie
doctrine preserves the integrity of state law from federal judicial
erosion. While the nation's long history of a general common law
as the rule of decision in federal courts prevents any confident
assertion that the Erie doctrine is constitutionally compelled, its
rooted nature today is additional evidence that the "tacit postulates" of state sovereignty continue to inform and shape the contours of federal jurisdiction. Thus, federal courts in diversity
cases "decide" issues of state law primarily because the alternative-manufacture of a general federal common law which would
displace state law in diversity cases-is even more invasive of
the states' sovereign authority to make and enforce their own
law.
These considerations are not present in a case ripe for Pullman abstention. Here, the federal courts can avoid decision of
the state law claims altogether by allowing the state courts the
opportunity to do so before the federal constitutional issues are
reached. In a manner consistent with the Erie doctrine, Pullman
abstention counsels against deciding the state issues in a federal
forum because the alternative in this instance - permitting the
state courts to decide the state law issues - is far less invasive
of the states' sovereign authority to make and enforce their own
law. Pullman abstention thus operates in tandem with Erie to
accomplish a common end: preservation of this aspect of the
residual sovereignty of the states.
It is here that the argument that Pullman abstention is a
creature of the Constitution, rather than equity, assumes its
shape. There is a structural principle embedded in the Constitution that operates to hem in federal jurisdiction. But that principle has been articulated and implemented by the Court in the
Pullman doctrine in such a way that it seems part of a shadow
Constitution, functioning somewhat like a shadow cabinet in a
parliamentary system to define by its opposing tension the outer
limits of the power that can be exercised by the nominal Constitution or cabinet. The Court has spoken of Pullman abstention
by using a curious lexicon composed of snippets of equity, slivers

76, at 912 n.141.
179. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 69-87 (discussing the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine).
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of federalism, and bits of judicial prudence. If one accepts the
idea that Pullman abstention is part of a constitutional structural principle, the Court's rhetoric is simply misleading, for it
suggests that the doctrine lacks the mandatory force of the
Constitution.
But from another perspective, the Court's rhetoric is quite
constitutional. Professor Bobbitt has written about the "prudential" mode of constitutional argument. The prudential mode is
characterized by a self-conscious attempt to respond to the context of the issue and to develop standards articulating the values
underlying the constitutional issue in question. Given the unknown context in which the matter will next arise, an attempt is
made to direct judges to apply those values in some necessarily
vague way.""" It is quite plausible to read the Court's approach
to the question of Pullman abstention as in the eddies, if not the
mainstream, of the prudential mode. Discretion is at the heart of
the prudential approach. Justice Frankfurter's reference in Pullman to the "federal chancellor" 8 2 can thus be viewed as an appeal to the prudential Constitution. It is no accident, I submit,
that Pullman itself was authored by Justice Frankfurter, one of
this century's foremost adherents to the prudential mode of con13
stitutional adjudication.
There is another aspect of the Pullman doctrine that suggests it has its roots in the prudential Constitution. Pullman operates to defer determination of federal constitutional issues in
the hope that final resolution of the state law issues will make
the federal constitutional decision unnecessary. There will be at
least some cases in which that hope will be realized. With respect to those cases, if the federal constitutional issue was nevertheless decided, such decision would be purely advisory. An
identical problem is posed by the United States Supreme Court
deciding a federal constitutional issue in a case squarely disposed of by a state's highest court on a point of state constitutional law.184 It is partly for that reason that the Court has fash181. See generally P. BoBBsrr, supra note 13, at 59-73.
182. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
183. Id. at 497.
184. See, e.g., Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984), in which the Court concluded
that the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court affirming a trial court's 'decision to
suppress evidence rested on adequate and independent state grounds. Nevertheless,
three justices concurred simply in order to opine that "neither the Federal Constitution
nor any decision of this Court requires the result reached by the Colorado Supreme
Court." Id. at 324 (White, J., concurring). That opinion produced a rebuke from Justice
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ioned the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine. Of
course, in the absence of Pullman abstention, the federal constitutional issue would not be advisory, but only because the federal constitutional issue would be rushed to a premature, and
often unnecessary, judgment.
The Pullman doctrine, while not compelled solely in order
to avoid advisory opinions of federal constitutional law, performs a constitutional prudential function in much the same
way as the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.
Both doctrines operate to insure that the federal courts do not
decide issues of federal law unnecessarily; both preserve to the
states the power to decide their own law. Both doctrines serve to
limit federal judicial power at the margin in order to preserve
the Constitution's intended design that the states retain plenary
authority over their own law.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Court is fully conscious that in crafting the Pullman doctrine it is defining constitutional boundaries. Were it acutely aware of this enterprise, it
would have built upon its conclusion in Reetz v. Bozanich 85
that Pullman abstention should apply when the state constitution contains a provision which might invalidate the state law
without a federal constitutional decision. If state law violates the
state constitution that is the end of the matter. It is only when
the state constitution has been considered and the conclusion
reached that the state law does not violate the state constitution
that the federal constitutional issue need be raised and decided.
The structural principle which seems to actuate Pullman abstention thus argues strongly for abstention in cases like Reetz,
where there is a possibility that the state constitution might be
dispositive.
8 e the Court
Instead, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
seemed to restrict this application of Pullman to situations in
which the state constitution provides some unique guarantee. In
Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero,1 8 7 the Court
fleshed out this restriction by holding that if the state constituStevens, who noted that Justice White's opinion was purely "an advisory opinion...
concerning the merits of the case. . . [O]nce we agree that we lack jurisdiction, this
case no more provides a vehicle for deciding the question upon which three Justices now
volunteer an opinion than if the petition for a writ of certiorari had never been filed." Id.
at 328 (Stevens, J., concurring).
185. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
186. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
187. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
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tional provision is a mirror image of a federal constitutional provision abstention is improper. The Court assumed that the state
provision would be interpreted in conformity with the federal
provision. In so deciding the Court seems to be burdened with a
sort of constitutional xenophobia, for it ignores the reality that
state constitutions are independent of the federal Constitution.
There is no principle which compels a state court to interpret its
equal protection guarantee, for example, as narrowly as the federal analogue. To illustrate, imagine a state law which is clearly
valid under the federal equal protection clause. If a state court
determines that the state law violates the state equal protection
guarantee, there is no need to consider any federal constitutional
issue. But the Constantineauand Flores de Otero decisions prevent this from happening and push the federal courts into an
inappropriate and premature decision of the federal constitutional issue. If the Court were more cognizant of the constitutional terrain of Pullman abstention, it would likely reconsider
these aberrant decisions.
Of course, it is possible that inconsistencies of this sort
demonstrate the lack of constitutional compulsion in the Pullman doctrine. However, if that were true, one would expect the
Court to abandon even Constantineau'srecognition of the idea
that if the state constitution affords some unique guarantee the
state courts should have the opportunity to dispose of the case
on that basis. The fact that the Court has left this opportunity
alive suggests that it has some glimmering of the constitutional
mandate. The fact that it fails to be more deferential to state
constitutions suggests that it lacks both a full appreciation of
the independent significance of state constitutions and of the
constitutional nature of the Pullman doctrine.
C. Burford Abstention
The abstention doctrine originating in Burford v. Sun Oil
the judgment of the Court that state regulatory
schemes involving issues of overriding state concern should be
left to the state courts.""' In the Burford case, Texas had created
Co.188 represents

188. 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (federal courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction
in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs).
189. As most recently restated by the Court, Burford abstention applies
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems
of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the
case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question
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an administrative system to review decisions of the Texas Railroad Commission, which regulates Texas' important oil and gas
industry. The administrative scheme was designed to achieve
uniformity and effectuate the substantive policies of Texas with
respect to the production of oil and gas. The Court concluded
that abstention from consideration of Sun Oil's challenge to a
licensing order of the Railroad Commission was necessary in order to avoid undermining the state's important substantive and
procedural policies embedded in the oil and gas administrative
scheme. 190 Burford did not, however, provide a general analytical
framework for deciding the difficult question of precisely which
state regulatory schemes involve issues of sufficiently overriding
state concern that their resolution should be left to the state
courts.
Eight years later, in Alabama Public Service Commission v.
Southern Railway,'9' the Court seemed to provide an answer.
The Court concluded that a federal suit brought by Southern
Railway challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's
refusal to permit discontinuance of certain Alabama train service should have been dismissed under the Burford doctrine because local train service was "primarily the concern of [Alabama]."' 92 The Court found that "intervention of a federal court
is not necessary for the protection of federal rights" whenever
"adequate state court review of an administrative order based
19 3
upon predominantly local factors is available."'
Thus, Burford abstention as expanded by Alabama Public
Service Commission seems related to the requirement that litigants contending that a state has violated their constitutional
rights must first exhaust their state administrative remedies
before filing a claim in the federal courts. 9 4 The Court's justifiin a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2514 (1989)
(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976)) (emphasis added).
190. Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-32.
191. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
192. Id. at 346 (quoting North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 511 (1945)).
193. Id. at 349.
194. See, e.g., Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675, 686 (1943);
First Natl Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450, 453-56 (1924). Suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are exempt from the requirement. See Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). But, of course, Younger abstention applies to such claims. See
supra text accompanying notes 145-56. In general, there is no requirement that a litigant
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cations for the exhaustion requirement are threefold: to ensure
that the states have an opportunity to protect federal constitutional rights, to be certain that the litigant's assertions of state
misconduct are well-founded, and to avoid unnecessary decisions
where the states may obviate the claim by their own actions.19 5
Like Younger abstention, the exhaustion requirement and its
close relative, Burford abstention, thus seem to be rooted in the
structural principle implicit in the supremacy clause, article III,
and the tenth amendment that both demands of and preserves a
role for the states to protect federal constitutional rights and to
control the implementation of state law.
The Burford doctrine's linkage with the constitutional root
of Younger abstention also helps to explain why the Court in its
application of Burford has required dismissal of the federal
claim, rather than a mere postponement of federal jurisdiction
as in Pullman. If the central justification for Burford is the necessity of preserving state courts' power to create and implement
their own law free from federal interference,19 and the state
courts are constitutionally obligated to preserve and protect federal constitutional rights, there is no need to retain federal trial
jurisdiction to relitigate federal issues present in the case. As
with the Younger doctrine, the Court requires state courts to assume their obligations to protect federal rights. Their errors, like
those of their federal judicial cousins, may be corrected by certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has never provided definitive guidance as to the precise triggers of Burford abstention,
preferring instead to describe the doctrine in broad generalities.
The Court continues to proclaim the Burford doctrine applicable whenever federal review of a state question "would be disexhaust state judicial remedies. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278, 284-86 (1913) (interpreting the fourteenth amendment); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983) overruled, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But
see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1908) (litigant must exhaust
both state administrative and judicial remedies if the state courts participate in the administrative process); 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (state tax collection issues); 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(state utility rate orders); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) (exhaustion of state judicial remedies
required for habeas corpus).
195. See, e.g., Prentis, 211 U.S. at 230.
196. To be sure, many commentators believe that the Burford rationale is simply
not clear. See Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 345, 347-48; Wells, supra note 11, at
1115-18; Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits ChallengingState AdministrativeDecisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 971, 1006 (1979)
(Burford abstention is "confused and cryptic").
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ruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern,"1 ' but has failed
to provide anything more specific. The most that can be said
about Burford is that the Court seems to have created and preserved the doctrine in recognition of structural limits the Constitution imposes on the federal judicial power, but has found it
difficult to articulate with any confidence the exact location of
this constitutional boundary. It is as if the Court believes that
the Constitution compels some limit, and the Court is able to
describe the general nature of the limit, but the Court is much
less able to enforce this limit in any predictable or meaningful
fashion.
D. Thibodaux Abstention
9 8 abstention doctrine, which is sometimes
The Thibodaux"
said to be a variant upon Burford abstention, 9 9 applies to cases
presenting for decision an uncertain or unsettled issue of state
law which is "intimately involved with [a state's] sovereign prerogative."2 0 0 In the Thibodaux case itself, a municipality sought
to condemn certain property of the defendant corporation. Since
diversity of citizenship was present, the corporation removed the
action to federal court, where the court stayed the federal proceedings to permit the state courts to resolve unclear issues of
state law regarding the municipality's authority to condemn the
defendant corporation's property. The Supreme Court affirmed
the trial judge's decision since it regarded the state law issue as
both unsettled and involving the state's "sovereign
prerogative."'10
But unlike Burford abstention, which appears to be appropriate whenever there are either "unsettled state law issues...
of transcendent importance ' 20 2 or if federal review of a state
question "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con-

197. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976), quoted in New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506, 2514 (1989).
198. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
199. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 308-10.
200. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
201. Id.
202. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 348.
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cern," 203 the Thibodaux doctrine requires that there exist both
unsettled state law issues and that the unsettled issues relate
intimately to the sovereign prerogative of a state. The proof of
this is not only in the fact that Thibodaux declared that to be
the test, but also that in a companion case to Thibodaux,
County of Alleghany v. Frank Mashuda Co., 20 4 the Court rejected the application of Thibodaux abstention although Frank
Mashuda involved substantially the same issue. The only apparent reason for the different result was that in Frank Mashuda
the state law pertinent to condemnation was absolutely clear.20 5
The explanation for the more restrictive approach to abstention taken by Thibodaux may lie in the fact that the
Thibodaux doctrine applies to diversity cases where, of course,
federal courts routinely apply state law. In Meredith v. Winter
Haven,20 8 a case decided sixteen years before Thibodaux, the
Supreme Court declared that it could find no basis upon which
to "exclude cases from [diversity] jurisdiction merely because
they involve state law or because the law is uncertain or difficult
to determine. ' 20 7 As discussed in the context of Pullman abstention, the requirement under the Erie doctrine that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction apply state law is designed in
considerable part to prevent the federal courts from eroding
state law by displacing it with an ever-expanding federal common law.2°s
There is thus a presumption that federal courts in diversity
cases are not impeding the development of state law by deciding
issues of state law. But this presumption partially breaks down
when the state law issue is an unsettled one. This breakdown
occurs because even though the federal court is theoretically do203. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814,
quoted in New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2514
(1989).
204. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
205. See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring) (declaring that
the difference between Thibodaux and Frank Mashuda was the presence in Thibodaux
of unclear state law regarding the condemnation power and the clarity of the state law
on the same point in Frank Mashuda); see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (applying Thibodaux abstention to a case which presented an
unsettled point of New Mexican water law that was a matter "of vital concern in...
arid... New Mexico, where water is one of the most valuable natural resources"). The
commentary generally agrees. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 607.
206. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
207. Id. at 236.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
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ing nothing more than forecasting the state rule once settled by
the state courts, its decision necessarily has some effect on the
final resolution of the state-law issue. 2 0 9 By itself, the danger of
forecasting state decisions might not be enough to call for abstention in a diversity case, but when the unsettled issue of state
law is one that is at the heart of the state's sovereign prerogative, the constitutional implications of the doctrine come into
clearer focus.
In a fashion somewhat evocative of Pullman abstention, the
Thibodaux doctrine is designed to permit the state courts to decide unsettled state law issues intimately bearing upon the
state's sovereignty without any "first-guessing" by the federal
courts. The fundamental constitutional rationale for Pullman
abstention is that it preserves a core aspect of state sovereignty:
the right to fashion its own law without federal interference.
Thibodaux takes a more restricted approach because in the context of diversity cases that rationale is weaker, due in no small
measure to the presence of the Erie doctrine. But because the
rationale is ultimately based on structural constitutional principle, it has not entirely evaporated. Rather, its presence is felt
when the issue requiring decision is one that is at the core of a
state's sovereignty.
Indeed, the two-part nature of the Thibodaux doctrine
reveals its constitutional foundation. The state law issue must
be unsettled because, if it were plain, the federal courts could be
trusted to decide it correctly. The unsettled issue must be one at
the center of state sovereignty for it is that residual value that
the Constitution protects from federal judicial invasion. In a
somewhat simplistic sense, Thibodaux abstention might be
209. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1989) (arguing that the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle has as much application in law as in physics). Professor Tribe describes the Heisenberg uncertainty principle as the unavoidable phenomenon of altering
the world by the very process of observing it. He offers this revealing example.
You have a very ill friend in the next room. . . . You want to find out how she
is faring ....
You call to her,'How are you doing?'. . . She replies, 'Fine.' But
the effort kills her ....
Clearly, the outcome is sadly misleading-the very
process of observation changed the system under study.
Id. at 18-19. The principle is no different with law, for as law "develops, [it] constantly
alters the warp and woof of the relevant epistemological space." Id. at 22. For other
e:xplorations of the related but larger point that the prevailing paradigm of legal thought
is breaking down and is evolving into a new paradigm, see G. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW
44-47 (1988); Massey, Rule of Law and the Age of Aquarius, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 757, 762
(1990).
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roughly characterized as holding that the federal courts simply
have no authority to make important state policies by deciding
issues of state law. In this sense, the doctrine is rather clearly
rooted in recognition of the constitutional principle of residual
state sovereignty or, if you prefer its mirror-image twin, implicit
and structural limitations upon the federal judicial power.
E.

Colorado River Abstention

An additional indication that the abstention doctrines are
rooted in a structural constitutional principle of state sovereignty, whether expressed as a right reserved to the states
through the tenth amendment or as an implicit limitation upon
federal judicial power, can be seen in those cases which the Supreme Court considers outside the abstention pigeonhole. In
21
Colorado River Water ConservationDistrict v. United States
the Supreme Court concluded that a federal court was entitled
to stay or dismiss a federal action when there exist "parallel actions filed in both state and federal courts" and the refusal to
exercise jurisdiction will "foster [the] sound management of
cases. '2 11 On its face, this would appear to be simply another
form of abstention, albeit a doctrine founded explicitly upon the
desire to avoid inconvenience to the courts by avoiding duplicative litigation.2 12 Hence, it is initially puzzling that the Court
does not regard Colorado River as a true abstention doctrine because it is not founded upon "considerations of state-federal
'21 3
comity or on avoidance of constitutional decisions.
The statement is illuminating since it suggests that the
Court regards "true" abstention as based upon the structural
constitutional principles which permeate the Younger, Pullman,
Burford, and Thibodaux abstention doctrines. Colorado River
thus represents a bastard form of abstention. A better way to
draw the distinction is to identify the "true" abstention doctrines as those compelled by the Constitution and to classify the
Colorado River doctrine as a discretionary abstention doctrine
not mandated by the Constitution.
210. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
211. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 11, at 1342 (citing Colorado River, 109 S. Ct. at
817).
212. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 315 (Colorado River abstention furthers "the convenience of the federal courts . . . [by] avoid[ing] duplicative litigation").
213. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1983).
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The interests at stake in Colorado River abstention provide
further support for this characterization. In Colorado River, the
Court suggested that the decision to abstain was proper when
the "interests of sound judicial administration clearly outweigh[]
'2 14
the 'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise jurisdiction.
The Court then identified several specific factors to be considered in making this judgment, including the presence of a res
and attendant difficulties of joint jurisdiction, inconvenience of
the federal forum, the order in which the state and federal proceedings were commenced, and the need to avoid duplicative litigation. 15 None of these factors have any roots in the structural
principle which seems to give vitality to the constitutionally
compelled abstention doctrines previously discussed. Rather,
these factors seem to be purely the product of an understandable judicial desire to make life simpler for all concerned. However laudable this impulse, it is virtually impossible to claim
that the Constitution compels the result. It may well be that the
critics of abstention have a strong case to level against the Colorado River doctrine, for it is plainly a refusal to exercise federal
jurisdiction that is not dictated by the necessity of honoring the
Constitution by policing the outer limits of federal jurisdiction.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although it has become fashionable in recent years to attack
the abstention doctrines as violative of the Constitution it is far
more plausible to regard the abstention doctrines as compelled
by the Constitution. The constitutional roots of these doctrines
lie in the mixed strand of textual, historical, and doctrinal arguments that combine to produce a powerful constitutional principle of structure: the idea that the judicial power of the United
States is implicitly limited in order to preserve a zone of residual
state authority to make and enforce the states' own law, free of
federal interference. The abstention doctrines struggle to
breathe life into this principle while at the same time maintaining fidelity to the time-honored constitutional principle that the
courts must exercise the jurisdiction that has been legitimately
bestowed upon them. Given this obligation of federal courts to
exercise their jurisdiction,
214. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 101, at 359 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at
817).
215. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19.
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their failure to do so can most easily be explained by positing a
judicial recognition that, in a dual sovereignty system, each
sovereign must be master of its own laws. Like a mountain
range that has been thrust upward by the collision of tectonic
has grown up by the colliplates, abstention is a doctrine that
216
sion of constitutional principles.
Except for the Colorado River doctrine, when abstention appears to be discretionary, that does not reflect a lack of constitutional foundation so much as it illustrates the continually shifting and hard-to-locate frontier of federal and state sovereignty.
The fact that the Court struggles to articulate, defend, and preserve these hard-to-fathom doctrines is evidence of its dedication to the constitutionally required task of policing the border
between federal and state judicial power.

216. Massey, supra note 31, at 82.

